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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the district 
court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ Section 78A-4-103(2)(e) and Utah Code Ann.§ 
78A-4-118(9). This is an appeal from an order of a Utah district court's ruling on the 
constitutionality of a statute and ordinance in a criminal case where the charge is other 
than a first degree felony or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 12, 2013, Sandy City Police Detective, Todd Davis, noticed 
an ad placed in backpage.com in the Salt Lake City Escorts subsection of the 
subsection of Salt Lake City Adult Entertainment. The ad stated in part, "I'm a hot 
brunette ready to come over and have some hot fun. I'm the real deal. No fake 
pies. No upsale no games. Call me once and I'll have you hooked." The ad 
included a phone number and partially nude pictures of a female, later identified as 
the defendant. Detective Davis sent a text message to the number listed on the ad 
and arranged to meet the defendant later that afternoon at a hotel room in Sandy 
for a fee of $200 for an hour. The defendant went to the room at the agreed upon 
time and accepted the $200 payment. After some discussion regarding what 
services she would provide, the defendant was cited for doing business as an 
escort in Sandy City without a Sexually Oriented business license in violation of 
Sandy City Ordinance§ 5-18-3, a class b misdemeanor. 
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SUMMARYOFARGUMENT 
The District court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Neither Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-41.5, nor Sandy City Ordinance§ 5-18-3 violate 
the Defendant's constitutional rights of freedom of speech or equal protection. 
These regulations are content neutral because they regulate conduct and not 
expression. As such, these regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny. The 
appropriate standard for determining the constitutionality of these content neutral 
regulations is the "incidental burden" test set forth by United States v. 0 'Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, (1968). These regulations meet the four criteria for constitutionality 
set forth by O'Brien. Further, the regulations do not violate the defendant's right 
to equal protection because they are rationally related to the government's attempt 
to minimize crime and health issues. Therefore, the Sandy City ordinance 
requiring the defendant to obtain a Sexually Oriented Business license prior to 
conducting business in the city of Sandy, and the statutory authorization for that 
ordinance, do not violate the defendant's constitutional rights of free speech and 
equal protection. 
ARGUMENT 
I. N"EITHER THE UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-8-41.5, NOR SANDY CITY 
ORDINANCE §5-18-3 ENACTED UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, VIOLATE 
THE DEFENDANT'S FIRST _AMENDMENT RIGHT BECAUSE THE 
REGULATION IS CONTENT NEUTRAL AND MEETS THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY. 
A. The rewlation imposed by Utah Statute and Sandv Ordinance is 
content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
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Generally, a "person employed in a sexually oriented business may not work in a 
ri:mnicipality if the municipality requires that [person] be licensed individually and 
if the person is not licensed by the municipality." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-8-
41.5(2)(a)-(b) (West 2010). Further, "city councils of cities may ... make it 
unlawful for any person to commit or offer to agree to commit an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire, lewdness, or moral perversion within the city ... " Id. § 10-8-
41 (1) (2012). Presently, "[it] shall be unlawful for any person to operate a sexually 
oriented business in [Sandy] City without a valid sexually oriented business 
license." Sandy City Ordinance Sect. 5-18-3, §12-2-4(a) (2004). For example, 
nude dancing and adult novelty stores were categorized as sexually oriented 
businesses, and so, were required to obtain sexually oriented business licenses. See 
American Bush v. City of So. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah 2006); 
Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). 
Where a regulation is content neutral the court should apply intermediate 
scrutiny. A regulation restricting conduct is considered "content neutral" where 
the content is not inherently expressive and ". . . should be treated as content 
neutral if the regulations are neutral as to message." Buscho v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n, 2009 UT 73, 225 P.3d 153, 160 (Utah 2009). "A regulation that 
classifies as based on unprotected conduct by definition does not classify based on 
protected expression and therefore is not content based." Id. Where the regulation 
is "facially neutral" the court should conclude that the regulation is content neutral 
absent evidence that the regulation was enacted with the intent of suppressing 
3 
protected speech. Id. at 162. The Supreme Court has ruled that "intermediate 
scrutiny'' is to be applied to regulations that attempt to limit speech in a·"content-
neutral" manner, including the restricting of sexually oriented businesses. See 
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440 (197 6); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). Further, municipalities may 
regulate the harmful secondary effects of a sexually oriented business in a 
"content-neutral" provided they meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. 
See Id., 475 U.S. at 47 (1986). See also, Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 
26, ,r 35, 73 P.3d 334, 342 (Utah 2003) ("Licensing schemes are constitutional if 
they are content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions."). 
Sandy City's requirement the Defendant obtain a sexually oriented business 
license before providing any escort services is content neutral. It is content neutral 
on its face because it does not regulate the content of the message. Further, there is 
no evidence presented that this regulation was passed with the intent of 
suppressing protected expression. The regulation requires the defendant to obtain a 
license before engaging in the escort business within the city limits. It does not 
dictate the content of the message and is therefore "content neutral." Therefore, 
any burden placed upon the defendant's freedom of speech is strictly incidental. 
The regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it is "content neutral." 
B. The regulation at issue meets the requirements of the O 'Brien test for 
intermediate scrutinv. 
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The appropriate test to apply in the instant case is the "incidental burdens" test 
set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, (1968). There are two tests 
established by the courts for applying intermediate scrutiny to content neutral 
regulations. The frrst is the "secondary effects" test. This test is applied when "the 
regulation at issue is content based, i.e. is directed at speech rather than conduct, 
but is justified with reference to the secondary effects associated with the speech 
rather than the communicative content of the speech." See, Bushco v. Utah State 
Tax Comm 'n, 2009 UT 73,225 P.3d 153, 164 (Utah 2009). The second test, is the 
0 'Brien test. This test "applies to regulations that are content neutral both on their 
face and as to purpose. This test is directed at determining whether a "sufficiently 
important governmental interest in regulating [conduct] can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment Freedoms." /d.(Citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). 
In the instant case, the requirement that the defendant obtain a Sexually Oriented 
Business License is content neutral. It is directed toward conduct and not at speech 
or the communicative content of speech. The regulation is facially neutral as to 
content and there is not evidence that it was passed with the purpose of restricting 
content. Any regulation of her speech therefore is only incidental to the regulation 
of this conduct. Therefore, the applicable test is the O 'Brien test. 1 
1 It should be noted that while the "secondary effects" test is not applicable in the 
instant case, the case law applying the "secondary effects" cited herein is of value 
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"Under O'Brien, a regulation of conduct is constitutional and must 
be upheld so long as: (1) it is within the power of the legislature to enact; (2) it 
furthers a substantial government interest; (3) the gove~ent interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of protected expression; and ( 4) any incidental restrictions it 
imposes on protected expression are not greater than is essential to further the 
interest." Id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).2 
In regard to the first prong of the O 'Brien test, the defendant does not 
allege that it is not within the power of the correspondin.g legislative body to adopt 
the statute or the Sandy ordinance authorized by the statute. The defendant argues 
the Sandy ordinance does not meet the second, third and fourth prongs of O 'Brien 
because the defendant is required by every municipality she wishes to conduct 
business in. 
In regard to the second prong, the case law regarding secondary effects is 
helpful because the courts have recognized that "it is well established that 
combating the secondary effects of adult businesses is a 'significant governmental 
interest."' Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Roy, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (10th Cir. 
20014) (citing City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50) For example, when a city required 
that a sexually oriented business be located within a certain zone, the court found 
in determio.mg whether a statute is content neutral and providing authority 
regarding the elements of the O 'Brien as discussed below. 
2See Appellant's Addendum "D." Third District Court, Order Denying Motion to 
Dismiss, Dated July 17, 2014. 
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the regulations were "justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech." City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (See also: 
Doctor John's Inc. v. City of Roy, 333 F.Supp. 2d 1168 (10 th Cir. 2004), ajf'd, 465 
F .3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006), (holding that a zoning regulation against an adult 
novelty store was constitutional); American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 
P .3d 123 5 (Utah 2006) (holding that a zoning regulation against an adult theater 
was constitutional)). In the instant case, the Sandy Ordinance is directed toward 
the harmful secondary effects that generally arise from a sexually oriented 
business, similar to the harmful effects found to result from an Adult novelty store 
and an Adult theater, such as crime and health issues, rather than banning the 
provider's actual conduct. See Sandy City Ordinance #4-049, § 12-2-4(a) (2004); 
Doctor John's Inc., 333 F.Supp. 2d 1168 (10 th Cir. 2004), ajf'd, 465 F.3d 1150 
(10th Cir. 2006); American Bush, 140 P.3d 1235. 
In regard to the third prong, the governmental interest, as discussed above, 
of registering Sexually Oriented Business workers is unrelated to the suppression 
of protected expression. The ordinance does not place any restriction upon the 
message or content of the licensed worker. It simply requires that the sexually 
oriented business worker obtain a license. As discussed above, any impact on the 
protected speech is strictly incidental because the ordinance does not regulate the 
content of the speech or its message. 
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Addressing prong four of O'Brien, the Sandy ordinance does not place any 
incidental restrictions on protected expression greater than are essential to further 
governmental interest. The content of the defendant's speech is not being 
regulated in any way. The city of Sandy simply requires the defendant obtain a 
license before engaging in business within its city limits. The defendant argues 
that Sandy should recognize the defendant's license in Midvale because it would 
be less restrictive upon the defendant. This argument appears to apply the "least 
restrictive means" test to the ordinance. The requirement established by O'Brien 
and subsequent rulings is that the "governmental interest would "be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation." Bushco v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2009 UT 73, 
225 P.3d 153, 168 (Utah 2009). The city's significant governmental interest in 
regulating sexually oriented businesses cannot be accomplished by relying upon 
surrounding jurisdictions because there is no higher authority to monitor or require 
municipalities adhere to uniform standards and enforcement. Further, it is not 
practical to require coordination between these municipalities. The regulatory 
authority has been given directly to the cities with no other higher authority 
available for coordinating the regulation. There is no statutory authority or case 
law that would impose this requirement on the city. 3 The Sandy Ordinance is 
designed .to allow promote its interest of promoting the safety and health of its 
citizens. The Sandy ordinance places a simple requirement upon the defendant that 
3 See Appellant's Addendum "D." Third District Court, Order Denying Motion to 
Dismiss, Dated July 17, 2014. 
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she obtain a license in order to promote its substantial governmental interest. That 
interest would be achieved less effectively absent this regulation. As such, the 
Sandy ordinance meets the fourth prong of O'Brien. 
In conclusion, the Defendant's freedom of speech is not constitutionally 
infringed upon. Sandy City's requirement the Defendant obtain a sexually oriented 
business license before the Defendant provide any escort services within the City's 
jurisdiction is constitutional because the ordinance is "content-neutral," within the 
power of the legislature to enact; furthers the substantial government interest of 
minimizing the criminal and health risks in the co111111unity, is unrelated to the 
suppression of protected expression and imposes no restrictions upon protected 
expression that are greater than is essential to further the interest. 
IL THE DEFENDANT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RlGHTS WERE NOT 
VIOLATED BECAUSE THE ORDINANCE IS RATIONALLY RELATED 
TO THE CITY'S ATTEMPT TO MIN1MIZE CRIME AND HEALTH 
CONCERNS 
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
that 'no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws."' City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985). Generally, legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if 
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. Id. Under the rational basis test, which gives great deference to the 
governmental body that created the law, the burden of proof is on the challenger to 
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show that the government's means are not rationally related to legitimate ends. See 
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
In support of her argument, the Defendant reiterates her argument regarding 
prong four O 'Brian above as additional argument that the state has violated her 
right to equal protection by giving the authority to Sandy City to pass a law 
requiring only those in her profession to obtain licenses in multiple jurisdictions. 
There is no authority supporting the idea that Sandy City should be required to 
coordinate its licensu.re efforts with other municipalities or to rely upon their 
licenses. Contrary to applicable law, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
mistakenly references certain businesses that do not fit within the sexually 
oriented businesses classifications and so do not require this type of licensing from 
the City. These cases also deal with licensing requirements where there already 
exists a higher licensing authority at the state level. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. 
Emery County, 702 P .2d 121 (Utah 1985) (general business licensing); Davis v. 
Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616 (Utah 1950) (licensing for attorneys). 
In the instant case, the defendant has not met her burden in showing that 
her right to equal protection has been violated. The defendant has not provided any 
evidence that this right has been violated. The requirement that the defendant 
acquire a license to conduct business as an escort is rationally related to the 
legitimate interest discussed above of addressing concerns of public safety and 
health. In conclusion, the Defendant's equal protection violation argument should 
be dismissed because the Defendant failed to meet their burden of proof. Further, 
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there has been not argument, nor evidence provided, that the defendant is a 
member of a protected class. Therefore, where there is a rational basis for the 
statute and ordinance, there has been no violation of the defendant's right to equal 
protection. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-41.5 and Sandy City 
Ordinance Sect. 5-18-3, Sandy City has the jurisdictional authority to require the 
Defendant to obtain a business license before conducting sexually oriented 
business activities in the municipality. Sandy City's requirement that a sexually 
oriented business license be obtained before the Defendant offer any escort 
services within the City's jurisdiction is constitutional. This is because the 
"content-neutral" ordinance in question. The ordinance in no way limits, or even 
addresses, an escort's freedom of speech. Any impact on the defendant's first 
amendment right is an "incidental burden." The regulation meets the O'Brien test. 
Sandy City and the state legislature granting Sandy the authority to pass its 
ordinance were acting within their legislative authority. The regulation furthers the 
substantial governmental interest of addressing criminal and health concerns 
involved in sexually oriented businesses. The governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of protected expression because it does not regulate speech and 
only requires escorts to obtain a license. Any incidental restrictions the regulation 
imposes on protected speech are only incidental because they are no greater than 
essential to further the governmental interest. Finally, the ordinance is reasonably 
11 
related to the governmental interest and does not violate the defendant's right to 
equal protection. For the foregoing reasons, the appellee respectfully requests this 
Court affirm the District Court's ruling denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
51 
Dated this~day of July, 2015 
City Prosecutor 
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